Generalizing knowledge from experimental data requires constructing theories capable of explaining observations and extending beyond them. Computational modeling offers formal quantitative methods for generating and testing theories of cognition and neural processing. These techniques can be used to extract general principles from specific experimental measurements, but introduce dangers inherent to theory: model-based analyses are conditioned on a set of fixed assumptions that impact the interpretations of experimental data. When these conditions are not met, model-based results can be misleading or biased. Recent work in computational modeling has highlighted the implications of this problem and developed new methods for minimizing its negative impact. Here we discuss the issues that arise when data is interpreted through models and strategies for avoiding misinterpretation of data through model fitting.
Introduction
Behavioral and physiological data in systems and cognitive neuroscience are generally collected in reduced environments and constrained experimental conditions, often designed to be diagnostic of competing theories. The generalization of knowledge from simple experiments is crucial to advance our broader understanding of brain and behavior. However, interpreting data according to existing theories causes our knowledge to be conditioned on the quality of said theories and the assumptions thereof. In many cases these conditions are met and theory can drive scientific progress by reducing a dazzling array of neuroscientific data into simpler terms, yielding falsifiable predictions. In other cases a general overarching theory can lead to wasted resources and, at worst, can even impede scientific progress.
Both the advantages and potential dangers of theory are amplified for computational theories, which provide extremely explicit predictions under a specific set of assumptions. Such theories offer an advantage over more abstract ones in that they make predictions about behavior or neurophysiology that are testable, falsifiable, and comparable across models. They do so by formalizing the fundamental definition of the model and linking it to experimental data through a set of assumptions (e.g., the particular form of the behavioral or neural likelihood distribution, conditional independencies in choice behavior, parameter stationarity, etc.). These assumptions can affect how we interpret evidence for or against a model, how we explain differences in the behavior of individuals or how we ascribe functional roles to biological systems based on physiological measurements. Here we examine the theoretical and practical consequences of these assumptions, paying special attention to the factors that determine whether a given assumption will give rise to spurious interpretations of experimental data. In particular, we highlight and evaluate methods used to minimize the impact of modeling assumptions on interpretations of experimental results.
What can go wrong?
While we appreciate that assumptions implicit in experimental designs are critical for data interpretation, and that inappropriate model selection or fitting techniques can produce misleading results, here we focus specifically on issues that can arise when computational models are appropriately and quantitatively linked to meaningful empirical data [1 ,2-4] (see Box 1 for relevant definitions). Under such conditions, quantitative model fitting offers at least three key advantages: first, competing models can be compared and ranked according to their abilities to fit empirical data, second, differences across individuals or task conditions can be assessed according to model parameter estimates, providing potential mechanisms giving rise to those differences, and third, neural computation can be evaluated by comparing physiological measurements to latent model variables. In this section we discuss recent work that highlights how each of these potential advantages can be negated by unmet assumptions.
The impact of modeling assumptions on the arbitration of competing models was recently highlighted in a factorial comparison of visual working memory models [5 ] . The 
